5 April Klein, Affiliated Directors: Puppets of Management or Effective Directors? (working paper, New York Univ., Stern Sch. Bus., January 1998), argues that an economic benefits hypothesis better explains board composition than a CEO influence hypothesis. Our assertion of a political role for outside directors with backgrounds in law or in politics emphasizes a particular economic benefit that these directors may provide and so is complementary to Klein's framework. (1993) . N = sample size. ernment and so knowledge of procedures as well as friendships with important decision makers. Second, it can arise from experience dealing with government as an adversary in administrative or legal proceedings. We adopt prior employment in government (or a political party) as a proxy for the first pathway and a degree in law as a proxy for the second. We use the biographies in the proxy statements of our sample firms to identify outside directors with either of these two politically useful characteristics.6 Table 2 provides means (medians) for the number of outside directors who have political experience and the number who have law degrees. In addition, the table details the proportions (of all directors) that these groups comprise. As in Table 1 , we do this for the entire sample and for industry subgroups. The average firm has 1.5 outside directors that we classify as being politically useful. These are about equally likely to be those with prior political experience and those 6 A few examples from our sample may provide a feel for the nature of those outside directors that we classify as being politically useful. On the board of Martin Marietta Corporation, an aerospace and defense firm, were Griffin Bell, a former attorney general of the United States (Mr. with law degrees. Again, there are few striking differences across industries. Textile firms are less likely to have directors with political backgrounds on their boards, and both transport equipment firms and instrument firms are a bit more likely to have such directors. Leather firms are more likely to have lawyers on their boards.
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C. Measures of the Importance of Politics
We assume that prior political experience and a law degree are characteristics of directors that are politically useful and argue that these directors, in part, play a political role. If this is true, those firms for which politics is most important should also be the firms whose boards contain the most outside directors with these politically useful characteristics. To investigate this, we construct three kinds of measures of the importance of politics to a firm.
The first is firm size. It follows from the argument of Ross Watts and Jerold Zimmerman that larger firms face more intensive political oversight.7 Specifically, greater firm size engenders greater political visibility and so a greater general importance of politics. The advantage of this measure is that it broadly measures the importance of politics. The disadvantage is that it is not a peculiarly political measure. The second group of measures focuses on three specific pathways through which politics might affect firm performance: government purchases, trade policy, and environmental regulation. Table 3 presents means (medians) for each of these measures of the importance of politics for our entire sample and for the industries described in Table 1 
III. POLITICS AND POLITICALLY USEFUL DIRECTORS: EMPIRICAL TESTS

A. The Importance of Politics and the Incidence of Politically Useful Directors
To test for the relation of politics to board composition, we regress the number of outside directors with political experience (NPOL) and the number with law degrees (NLAW) on our measures of the importance of politics. We also include board size (the total number of directors, BDSIZE) as a control in these regressions. Controlling for board size serves two purposes. First, larger firms tend to have larger boards. As a consequence, larger firms will likely have more directors of any type, including those that we have identified as being politically useful. Controlling for board size eliminates the possibility of a spurious positive relation between firm size and the incidence of politically useful directors and allows a straightforward interpretation of the coefficient on firm size. Second, controlling for board size allows us to interpret the coefficients on all of the importance of 
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THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS mean) in politically experienced directors. Pollution abatement expenditure (PPAE), however, is unrelated to the number of such directors. In panel B, which examines the incidence of outside directors with law degrees, the reverse is true. Greater pollution abatement expenditure leads to a greater number of directors with legal backgrounds-an increase of .13 or 17 percent for a 1 standard deviation increase in pollution abatement costs as a percentage of shipments-but increased sales to government and increased exports have no effect.
Columns 5-7 of Table 4 examine The story in Table 4 is that where politics is more important, the incidence of those outside directors with political backgrounds and those with law degrees is greater. This is consistent with these directors playing, at least in part, a political role. But Table 4 also shows differences in the determinants of politically experienced directors and lawyer-directors. Both are more prevalent in larger firms. But only politically experienced directors are more prevalent where sales to government or exports are greater, and only lawyer-directors are more prevalent where environmental regulation costs are greater. Moreover, lobbying seems more positively related to the incidence of politically experienced directors than to that of lawyer-directors. This suggests that the political roles played by these two sorts of directors may differ. That is, they may not be substitutes. As one test, we calculated correlation coefficients between the residuals from the panel A and panel B versions of each regression. If the politically experienced and lawyers are substitutes on boards, we would expect these residuals to be negatively correlated. They are not. Each correlation coefficient is significantly positive (with a typical value of .3), suggesting that the roles played by politically experienced directors and by lawyer-directors may be complementary. One possibility is that politically experienced directors help to cajole government (and so are useful where sales to government, export policy, and lobbying are more important) and lawyer-directors help to confront government (and so are useful where environmental regulation is more important) and that these activities go hand in hand as carrots and sticks.
B. The Changing Importance of Politics: Retail Competition in Electricity
Recent changes in the electric utility industry provide a natural experiment that allows for a time-series test for the impact of politics on board composition. Traditionally, electric utilities have been regulated by the states. This regulation entails the assignment of geographic markets to single utilities and the requirement that the designated utility provide all of the electricity demanded at prices set by the regulators. Unlike manufacturing firms for which politics matters in multiple ways, the primary locus of political importance for electric utilities has been the state regulatory commissions that set prices and approve new investments in generation and transmission facilities. Two federal acts began (quite slowly, at first) substantial change that is now occurring in the structure of the electric utility industry.13 In 1978, the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act required utilities to purchase power generated by small generating facilities and cogenerators. This allowed modest entry into power generation. Later, in 1992, the Energy Policy Act required utilities to provide access to their transmission facilities to other power generators. This allowed geographic competition for the power produced by generators. What is more important, these changes led to pressure to alter the structure of state regulation. Indeed, this pressure is to deregulate electricity prices and to allow retail customers to purchase power from any generator, with the power delivered over existing transmission facilities. Beginning in the mid-1990s, states began to introduce programs to phase in (sometimes over many years, typically leaving the current retail price regulated) such retail competition in electricity. California, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania were among the first states to enact legislation 192 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS introducing retail competition in electricity. By 1997, 10 states had enacted legislation (or imposed a comprehensive regulatory order) introducing retail competition. By March of 2000, the number had risen to 24, and pressure is strong in most other states to follow suit.
The ongoing movement from traditional regulation of electric utilities toward retail competition that began in the 1990s has increased the role of politics in this industry. Prior to this movement, politics affected electric utilities largely through state regulatory commissions. Now, substantial wealth stands to be gained or lost with the advent of retail competition. The process by which competition is introduced (for example, provisions for recovering the costs of noneconomic generating facilities or "stranded costs") is of great importance to electric utilities. Accordingly, we should see increased incidence of politically experienced directors on the boards of electric utilities during the 1990s.14 Our test begins with the set of "Forbes 800" firms in 1987 (from which the sample of manufacturing firms examined in the preceding subsection was constructed). We first identified the 43 firms that were electric utilities (SIC = 491). For each of these firms, we also selected a manufacturing firm closest in size as measured by total assets as a control firm. For each of the 43 firms in the utility sample and for each of the 43 firms in the control (manufacturing) sample, we examined 1988 proxy statements to determine the number of inside directors, the number of outside directors, the number of outside directors with political experience, and the number of outside directors with law degrees. We then repeated this procedure for each of these firms that remained as independent public companies in 1999. Thirty-one of the 43 electric utilities remained in 1999, and 35 of the 43 control (manufacturing) firms remained. This gave us information about the size and composition of corporate boards and the political characteristics of outside directors for both the utility sample and the control sample at two moments in time, prior to the movement toward retail competition in electricity (1988) and during this movement (1999).
The first two rows of Table 5 describe board size and the proportion of outside directors for our sample firms. In 1988, average board size for the electric utility sample was about 12.5, and that for the manufacturing (control) sample was about 13.8. The boards of utilities were significantly smaller than those of similarly sized manufacturing firms. Moreover, utility boards were significantly more dominated by outsiders. Seventy-nine percent of utility directors were outsiders compared to only 72 percent of manufacturing directors. By 1999, boards of both electric utilities and manufacturing firms had shrunk. Utility boards averaged about 11 members, and manufacturing boards averaged about 11.9 members. In both cases the decline was primarily the result of fewer inside directors. By 1999, the percentage of outside directors rose to 85 percent for utilities and to 83 
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THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS percent for manufacturers. In 1999, the boards of electric utilities looked very similar to the boards of manufacturing firms.
The remainder of Table 5 addresses our prediction that the increased importance of politics to electric utilities brought on by the 1990s move toward retail competition will lead to greater incidence of politically experienced outside directors. To begin, consider the picture in 1988 prior to the movement toward retail competition in electricity. The typical utility board included about .9 lawyerdirectors and only about .5 politically experienced directors. Lawyers made up 7 percent of board members, while those with political backgrounds made up only 4 percent. Lawyers were significantly more important than those with political experience on utility boards. This difference is peculiar to electric utilities. The typical manufacturing firm at the time had one lawyer-director and one director with political experience (each making up 7 percent of the board).
In 1999, during the movement toward retail competition, the average number of politically experienced directors on electric utility boards rose to about .8, and the percentage of board members made up by these directors rose to 7 percent. No change occurred in the incidence of lawyer-directors. In contrast, in 1999 the average number of politically experienced directors on the boards of manufacturing firms fell to just .5 and the percentage of such directors also fell to 5 percent. The difference between these intertemporal changes in the incidence of politically experienced directors for utilities and for manufacturing firms is statistically significant (see the last column of Table 5 ). Accordingly, Table 5 provides evidence consistent with the increased importance of politics among electric utilities in the 1990s leading to greater incidence of politically experienced directors. This time-series evidence confirms the cross-sectional evidence on the role of politics in board composition.
C. A Political Role for Women Directors?
We have argued that outside directors with backgrounds in politics or the law play a political role by providing advice and insight into the political dealings of firms and perhaps by acting on the firm's behalf. But there also may be an entirely different political role for outside directors. If diversity is particularly valued by those in government (as it seems to be valued by some institutional investors),15 board diversity may work directly to curry political favor.
To assess this possibility, we used the proxy statements for both the manufacturing and the utilities samples to identify the number of outside directors who were women (relying primarily on names and gender-specific pronouns in the biographical descriptions). Using this variable, NWOMEN, we repeat the tests reported in Tables 4 and 5 Panel A of Table 6 provides results for regressions like those in Table 4 , but with NWOMEN as the dependent variable. As was the case for politically experienced directors and lawyer-directors, controlling for board size, larger firms have more women outside directors. The coefficient estimate in column 1 implies that a 1 standard deviation increase in LSIZE results in .17 (26 percent) more women directors. But the other political variables are never significantly positively related to the incidence of women directors.
Panel B of Table 6 summarizes the number of women directors on the boards of electric utilities and on the boards of similarly sized manufacturing firms, both in 1988 and in 1999. For both electric utilities and manufacturing firms, the incidence of women directors increased between 1988 and 1999 but by approximately the same amount.16 For both types of firms, the average number of women directors rose from about .9 to about 1.5. This similarity suggests that politics was not driving the increase in the incidence of women directors.
IV. CONCLUSION
Those outside directors with backgrounds in politics or government and those with backgrounds in law are more numerous on the boards of firms for which politics is more important. Confirmation comes from cross-sectional regressions of the number of such politically useful directors in U.S. manufacturing firms on several measures of the importance of politics and from the intertemporal increase in the number of politically experienced directors on the boards of electric utilities during the current move toward retail competition in electricity.
This evidence that politics affects board composition suggests that some outside directors do play a political role, a possibility that has not been examined in prior research. Lack of similar evidence for women directors suggests that they do not play a political role. Extensions of this research to other countries or to other time periods where the importance of politics differs are interesting topics for future research. 16 The percentage of electric utilities with any women outside directors did rise (to 100 percent in 1999) relative to the percentage of manufacturing firms with any women outside directors. + Statistically significant at the 10% level in two-tailed tests. ** Statistically significant at the 1% level in two-tailed tests.
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